On November 2, 2020, sinopec Beihai LIQUEFIED Natural Gas Co., LTD. (hereinafter referred to as Beihai LNG Company) caught fire while simultaneously loading rich and poor liquids of the second phase of the project in Tieshan Port (Linhai) Industrial Zone of Beihai City, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. As of December 2, the accident caused 7 deaths, 2 serious injuries, direct economic losses of 20.293 million yuan.
After investigation, it was determined that the direct cause of the accident was that, during the implementation of the second phase of the project, the isolation valve was opened, and THE LNG in the low-pressure external transmission manifold was ejected from the cut pipe mouth, and the mixed gas of THE LNG atomized air mass and the air generated combustion when meeting the possible ignition energy. Improper accident indirectly causes include isolation valve, instrument engineer not according to the provisions of the instrument interlock for examination and approval procedures and operating procedures, inadequate confirmed when hot working conditions, safety risk consciousness and control does not reach the designated position, “small business owners big contracting” labor production organization mode make the safe production management responsibility implementation does not reach the designated position, the contractor management does not reach the designated position, etc.
In view of the accident report, HSE experts from the safety production Office of the Petrochemical Federation conducted an online discussion and made the following conclusions:
1) The accident occurred without effective isolation of dangerous energy sources. There were problems in the logic of the EMERGENCY shutdown system of ESD in SIS system, and the blind plate pumping failed to play a role. More importantly, do not trust the “system” too much, any system has the possibility of failure. LOTOTO(calibrate/lock/test) using physical linkage where possible. Confirmation and approval shall be made according to the authority and responsibility of management personnel at all levels.
2) There is no effective approval procedure for performing hazardous work, and no pre-work safety assessment (JSA) is conducted before work. According to the strict examination and approval procedures for dangerous operations, the applicant and supervisor should strictly implement the safety assessment before the operation, and the approval should go to the site for confirmation before approval.
3) The accident investigation report seems to be very careful, and even the points and minutes are clearly written: at 11:20, the cutting has been completed on the side near the tank, and at 11:40, why did it urge the instrument interlocking work ticket? Second, this valve should be a low liquid level cut-off valve. When and how was it closed? Not so many people did not understand the valve closed to urge the engineer to close the valve again. A lot of questions about details, but no focus, no thread. It’s hard to understand.
Post time: Oct-30-2021